تحلیل رفاهی تعامل بین دولت و بانک مرکزی در چارچوب بازی‌های سیاستی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اداری دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران

2 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اداری دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران

3 استادیار گروه اقتصاد دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصادی دانشگاه فردوسی، مشهد، ایران

چکیده

هماهنگی میان سیاست‌های پولی و مالی، به جهت وجود اثرات بازخوردی سیاست‌ها و یا بین‌­دوره‌ای بودن تصمیم‌گیری‌ها، امری ضروری است. زیرا ممکن است سیاست‌های اجرا شده توسط یک نهاد، سیاست‌های اتخاذ شده از سوی نهاد دیگر را به شکلی زیانبار تحت تأثیر قرار داده و در نهایت رفاه جامعه کاهش یابد. از این‌رو دستیابی به اهداف مطلوب اقتصادی، منوط به وجود ترتیبات نهادی و سازوکاری مناسب برای هماهنگی میان مقامات سیاست‌گذار است. در این پژوهش، پس از الگوسازی معادلات ساختاری اقتصاد ایران، قاعده بهینه برای سیاستگذار پولی و مالی، در قالب بازی‌های سیاستی مختلف استخراج شد؛ سپس معادلات پایه به کمک روش گشتاورهای تعمیم یافته، برای دورهزمانی 1395-1384، تخمین زده شد و پارامترهای آن در شبیه‌سازی بازی‌ها (در سه وضعیت: بازی نرمال، بازی رهبری استاکلبرگ و بازی همکارانه) مورد استفاده قرار گرفت. شبیه‌سازی بازی‌ها به کمک نرم افزارصورت گرفت و ارزشحداقل زیانایجادشدهبرایهر بازیکن و جامعه محاسبه گردید. تحلیل نتایج نشان داد که بهترین شرایط رفاهی در حالت همکاری دو نهاد پولی و مالی ایجاد خواهد شد. اما چنانچه امکان ایجاد نهادی هماهنگ کننده میان این دو نهاد وجود نداشت، رهبری بانک مرکزی به عنوان بهترین تعامل پیشنهاد می‌گردد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Welfare Analysis of Interactions between Government and Central Bank: The Policy Games Approach

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mina Mohtashami 1
  • Mohammad Ali Ehsani 2
  • Mahdi Feizi 3
1 Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran
2 Associate Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran
3 Assistant Professor of Economics, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran
چکیده [English]

Coordination between monetary and financial policies is essential due to the feedback effects of the policies as well as intertemporal decision-makings; As policies enforced by an institution may affect policies adopted by another entity in a destructive manner, the welfare of the society may be reduced ultimately. Therefore, to achieve the desired economic goals, appropriate institutional arrangements, and mechanism for the adequate coordination between the policy makers is required. In this study, after modeling the structural equations of the Iranian economy, the optimal rule for the monetary and fiscal policymakers, in form of the different policy games, was extracted. then, the basic equations were estimated using the data of 2005-2016 period, and their parameters were used in games simulation (in three situations: normal game, Stackelberg leadership game, as well as cooperative game). The games were simulated, and the value of the minimum losses incurred for each player and community was calculated. Comparison and analysis of the results show that the best welfare is created by the cooperation of both monetary and financial institutions. But if it is not possible to establish a coordinating institution between the two, central bank leadership is suggested as the best interaction.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Cooperative Game
  • Monetary and Financial Policy
  • Interbank Rate
  • Game Theory

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